Hot Cargo Agreements in the Construction Industy: The Effect of Acco Equipment by Carlin, Allan H
Boston College Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 6 Number 6 Article 5
7-1-1974
Hot Cargo Agreements in the Construction
Industy: The Effect of Acco Equipment
Allan H. Carlin
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Construction Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Students Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For
more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Allan H. Carlin, Hot Cargo Agreements in the Construction Industy: The Effect of Acco Equipment, 15
B.C.L. Rev. 1292 (1974), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol15/iss6/5
STUDENT COMMENT
HOT CARGO AGREEMENTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY: THE EFFECT OF
ACCO EQUIPMENT
A hot cargo clause may be broadly defined as a provision in a
collective bargaining agreement which stipulates that the contract-
ing employer will not conduct business with, nor deal in the goods
of, a nonunion enterprise.' Section 8(e) 2 of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) 3 prohibits the execution of such provisions in
all areas of commerce with the exception of the construction and
garment industries. While the exemption granted to the garment
industry has never been the source of much litigation, 4 the interpre-
tation and application of the construction industry proviso presented
difficulties during the years immediately following the enactment of
section 8(e) in 1959. One of the controversies concerned the limita-
tions imposed upon the right of labor and management to execute
hot cargo agreements. The language of the proviso clearly restricts
the subject matter of these clauses to work performed on the site of
construction. 5 However, some legislators have suggested that the
exemption encompasses agreements relating to work which could
have been performed on the jobsite, but which is actually performed
' In the vernacular of organized labor, the subject of hot cargo agreements arc goods
produced or transported by an "unfair" employer. The term unfair employer refers to either "a
struck employer, to an employer whose goods bear no union label, or to an employer whose
wages or other working conditions are deemed substandard by the union." BNA, The Labor
Reform Law 91 (1951). See also S. Rep, No, 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 79, reprinted in 1
Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 475
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History].
2 29 U.S.C. I) 158(e) (1970) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, trans-
porting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any employer, or to cease
doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into
heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforc-
able and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agree-
ment between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry
relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of
construction, alteration, painting or repair of a building, structure or other work:
Provided further, That for the purposes of this subsection . . . the terms "any
employer", "any person engaged in commerce or in industry affecting commerce",
and "any person" when used in relation to the terms "any other producer, processor
or manufacturer", "any other employer", or "any other person" shall not include
persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor
working on the goods or premises of the jobber or manufacturer or performing parts
of an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing industry . . .
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-87 (1970).
• Sec ABA, Section of Labor Relations Law, The Developing Labor Law (C. Morris ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as The Developing Labor Law].
5 See note 2 supra.
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in an offsite industrial plant. 6 The National Labor Relations Board,
adopting the view that the plain-face meaning of the statute is
controlling, has rejected this expansive reading of the proviso.'
Another area of dispute involved the right of construction unions to
conduct a strike for the purpose of obtaining a hot cargo agreement.
In reversing the decisions of the Board, 8 three circuit courts have
held that labor could apply concerted pressure in pursuit of such an
objective. 9 This conflict was settled by the acquiescence of the
agency to the position adopted by the courts. 1 °
The resolution of these issues by the judicial and administrative
bodies resulted in the development of a stable and predictable body
of law. However, this sense of certitude was recently disrupted by
the decision in Operating Engineers, Local 12 (Acco Equipment), 11
in which the Board held that the construction industry proviso does
not encompass an agreement relating to the jobsite repair of heavy
duty equipment. 12 Prior to this case, the proscription of section 8(e)
did not limit the right of a union to execute an agreement relating to
work performed on the site of construction." The Board has now
indicated that the nature of the jobsite work will determine the
applicability of the proviso.
This restrictive interpretation of the exemption urges considera-
tion of the purpose behind the extension of the preferential treat-
ment to the construction industry. In conducting such an inquiry,
this comment will seek to delineate the appropriate scope of the
6
 105 Cong. Rec. 19785 (1959), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 1, at 1815
(remarks of Senator McNamara); 105 Cong. Rec. 19809 (1959), reprinted in 2 Legislative
History, supra, at 1816 (remarks of Representative Thompson). Senator Kearns expressed the
contrary view that the proviso only encompasses agreements relating to work actually per-
formed on the jobsite. 105 Cong. Rec. 20004 (1959), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra,
at 1861.
8 . Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council (Cardinal Indus., Inc.), 136 N.L.R.B. 977, 49
L.R.R.M. 1908 (1962). See text accompanying notes 80-83 infra for a further discussion of this
issue.
8
 Essex County & Vicinity Dist. Council of Carpenters (Associated Contractors, Inc.),
141 N.L.R.B. 858, 52 L.R.R.M. 1416 (1963), vacated, 332 F.2d 636, 56 L.R.R.M. 2091 (3d
Cir. 1964); Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 (Calhoun Drywall Co.), 139
N.L.R.B. 383, 51 L.R.R.M. 1315 (1962), remanded, 32B F,2d 534, 55 L.R.R.M. 2293 (D.C.
Cir. 1964); Construction, Prod. & Maintenance Laborers Local 383 (Colson & Stevens Constr.
Co.), 137 N.L.R.B. 1650, 50 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1962), rev'd, 323 F.2d 422, 54 L.R.R.M. 2246
(9th Cir. 1963).
° See circuit court cases cited in note 8 supra.
'° Building & Constr. Trades Council (Centlivre Village Apts.), 148 N.L.R.B. 854, 57
L.R.R.M, 1081 (1964), remanded with directions to dismiss on another point, 352 F.2d 696,
59 L.R.R.M. 2894 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
n 204 N.L.R,B, No. 115, 83 L.R.R.M. 1457 (1973).
12
 Id. at 2, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1458.
13
 In a case involving the identical repair work provision as that in Acco Equipment, the
Board held that such work can be made the subject of an agreement within the proviso.
Operating Eng'rs, Local 12 (B.R. Schedell Contractor, Inc.), 145 N.L.R.B. 351, 54 L.R.R.M.
1391 (1963). Whether or not the theory upon which the charging party prevailed in Acco
Equipment was presented to, or considered by, the Board in Schedell is not clear from the
1963 opinion.
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proviso. After an analysis of the judicial and administrative applica-
tion of the pertinent national labor legislation prior to the amending
of the NLRA in 1959, attention will be directed to the congressional
debate concerning the adoption of section 8(e). This discussion will
demonstrate that the proviso was enacted to provide construction
unions with a means to prevent the subcontracting of work to
nonunion employers. In the context of this background, the decision
in Acco Equipment will be discussed, and it will be submitted that
the conclusion of the Board in this case is erroneous. Finally, the
ramifications of this decision upon the course of future litigation will
be examined.
A brief discussion of labor's right to exert concerted pressure
upon management is necessary to an understanding of the purpose
behind the adoption of section 8(e). Prior to the enactment of the
Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, unions could achieve their goals by strik-
ing or picketing either of two employers: (1) the "primary" employer,
the party with whom the union was actually in dispute; or (2) a
"secondary" employer who was neutral to the dispute of the union,
but with whom the primary employer maintained a business
relationship. 14 By severing relations between these parties, unions
hoped that the primary employer would be forced to satisfy their
demands.
The relatively weak bargaining position of individual em-
ployees in a management-oriented sOsciety premised the right of
unions to exert pressure upon both the primary and secondary
employers." Congress granted this power to encourage the growth
and development of organized labor." However, in less than two
decades, unions became powerful" enough to call crippling strikes
14 "Labor dispute," as defined by § 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §
113(c) (1970), includes "any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or
not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." (Emphasis
added.) See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941).
15 The purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is set forth as follows:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of govern-
mental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms
of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to
exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to
obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should
be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he shall have full
freedom of association, self-organization and designation of representatives of his
own choosing . . . -,
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
16 The Developing Labor Law, supra note 4, at 22-23.
17 Between 1932 and 1947, union membership increased from three million to fifteen
million and collective bargaining agreements governed the rights of labor and management in
several major industries. A. Cox & D. Bak, Labor Law 130 (6th ed. 1965).
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both during 18 and after° World War II. Congress responded to the
potentially paralyzing effects of these concerted activities upon the
economy by enacting the Taft-Hartley Act. 2° Legislative attention
focused upon minimizing "industrial strife which interferes with the
normal flow of commerce." 21 Essential to the successful implemen-
tation of this policy was the prohibition of secondary boycotts:
[Congress] aimed to restrict the area of industrial conflict
insofar as this could be achieved by prohibiting the most
obvious, widespread and ... dangerous practice of unions
to widen that conflict: the coercion of neutral employers,
themselves not concerned with a primary labor dispute,
through the inducement of their employees to engage in
strikes or concerted refusals to handle goods. 22
Section 8(b)(4)(A) 23 was designed to ban secondary activity. 24
This section prohibited a union from inducing employers to engage
in a concerted refusal to work, where an objective of this action was
to prevent an employer from conducting business with another
employer. The framers of this act did not contemplate the proscrip-
tion of primary activity; 25 however, the language of this section fails
to articulate a workable test for distinguishing between proscribed
secondary conduct and permissible primary conduct. Every boycott,
whether effectuated by a strike or a picket line, includes a desire to
sever relations between the primary and secondary employers. 26 As
18 Id.
14
 See Reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 Geo. Wash, L. Rev.
285, 288 (1960),
25
 Id. at 289. The author states that over 200 bills designed to curb the power of labor
were offered during the first week of the congressional session. Id.
21
 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970),
22
 Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 100 (1958),
23
 Section 8(b)(4)(A) was amended in 1959 to § 8(b)(4)(8), but its contents remained
substantially the same. The original § 8(b) provided:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . (4) to
engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a
strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport or otherwise handle or work on any goods . .. where an object
thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring ... any employer or other person to cease using,
selling, handling, transporting or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
producer . , . or to cease doing business with any •other person . , .
Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 8(b)(4), 61 Stat. 141,
	 •
24
 Under the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it became impossible to stop a
secondary boycott or any other kind of strike no matter how unlawful it may have
been at common law. All this provision of the bill [§ 8(b)(4)1 does is to reverse the
effect of the law as to secondary boycotts.
93 Cong. Rec. 4198 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
23
 See, e.g., NLRB v. Operating Engineers, Local 825, 400 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1970);
Local 761, IUE v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 672-81 (1961).
26
 Intended or nut, sought for or not, aimed for or not, employees of neutral
employers do take sympathetic action with strikers and do put pressure on their
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applied to the contents of section 8(b)(4)(A), this realization renders
the primary-secondary dichotomy illusory, i.e., since all concerted
activity has an object of forcing an employer to cease dealing with
others, one could interpret section 8(b)(4)(A) as banning all boycotts.
In light of this paradox, the Board and the courts did not
strictly apply the language of this section. Restrictions upon the
seemingly all-inclusive definition of secondary activity were
achieved by reference to section 7 27 and section 13 28 of the Act. 29
These sections preserve the right of unions to engage in concerted
activity for the purpose of mutual aid or protection. In balancing
this power with the provisions of section 8(b)(4)(A), the judicial and
administrative bodies have developed broad definitions of primary
and secondary conduct: concerted activity which has an object of
halting the day-to-day business of the primary employer is not
banned by section 8(b)(4)(A). 3 ° Although this activity has the inci-
dental effect of disrupting the relationship between the primary and
secondary employer, such conduct is not tantamount to an unfair
labor practice under this section. 3 ' On the other hand, concerted
activity which has an object of disrupting the relationship between
the primary and secondary employer is proscribed by section
8(b)(4)(A). 32
These principles were formulated to conform "with the dual
Congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organiza-
tions to bring pressure on offending employers in primary labor
disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from
pressure on controversies not their own.." 33 However, as applied to
the construction industry, section . 8(b)(4)(A) prevented labor from
utilizing strikes or picket lines to secure work for their members. In
this respect, construction union members were deprived of powers
enjoyed by organized labor in other areas of commerce. This dispa-
rate treatment derived from the difference between employment
practices on a construction project and those which exist in other
enterprises.
In a typical business, the entire labor force is hired by a single
employers . . . It is dear that, when a union pickets an employer with whom it has a
dispute, it hopes, even if it does not intend, that all persons will honor the picket
line, and that hope encompasses the employees of neutral employers who may in the
course of their employment have to enter the premises.
Seafarers Union v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 585, 590-91, 43 L.R.R.M. 2465, 2468-69 (D.C. Cir.
1959), as quoted in Local 761, IUE v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 673 (1961).
21 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
28 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970).
Compare NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951), with NLRB
v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council: 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
38 See, e.g., Steelworkers Union v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492, 499 (1964).
31 See, e.g., National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 627 (1967),
32 See, e.g., Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 388 (1969).
33 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
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employer. 34 By picketing the situs of the enterprise, organized labor
could exert pressure upon an employer to recognize the union as
the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees. 36 This conduct is
legitimate primary activity37 provided the union does not induce the
employees of a secondary employer to refuse to cross the picket
line. 38 After a union has received recognition, the employer cannot
avail himself of the lower wage demandS of nonunion members.
Consequently, union members would not be at a competitive disad-
vantage in securing employment.
Workers in the construction industry are generally hired by a
number of independent employers to whom the general contractor
has subcontracted portions of the project. 39 Therefore, in terms of
providing employment for its members, the major consideration of
unions is not the organization of nonunion subcontractors. Unless
the general contractor awards contracts to union crafts, the recogni-
tional and organizational pursuits of labor are futile.
34
 See H.R. Rep, No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess, 22 (1959), reprinted in 1 Legislative
History, supra note 1, at 780.
35
 The right of a union to picket for recognitional purposes derives from § 7 of the
Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). See, e.g., NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639, 362 U.S.
274, 279 (1960). Limitations upon this right were imposed by the enactment of § 8(b)(7), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1970), in 1959. See Meltzer, Organizational Picketing and the NLRB:
Five on a Seesaw, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 78 (1962), for a comprehensive analysis of the effect of
this section.
36
 Section 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment . . .
The provisions of § 9 permit an employer and a labor organization to recognize the union
as the exclusive bargaining agent. However, under § 9(c)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c)(1)(A)
(1970), employees may file a petition to the NLRB challenging the representative capacity of
the union. If the employer grants recognition to a union which does not have a majority
status, his conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(.2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)
(1970). See ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961),
The adoption of # 8(f), 29 U.S.C. § 158(1) (1970), to i959 exempted the construction
industry from the procedures of § 9(a). This section allows an employer and a labor organiza-
tion in the construction industry to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement even though
the "majority status of such labor organization has not been established under the provisions
of § 159 of this title prior to the making of such agreement . , ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1970).
The final proviso to § 8(f) provides that a representation election may be called at any time to
question the union's majority status. See Note, 15 B.C. Ind, & Com. L. Rev, 862 (1974) for
an extensive discussion of § 8(1).
37
 NLRB v, International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
38
 Id. In NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960), the Court said: It seems
clear . . . that Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act authorized the Board to regulate peaceful
"recognitional" picketing only when it is employed to accomplish objectives specified in
§ 8(b)(4) . . ." 362 U.S. at 290.
39 Comment, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on the Building and Construction
Industry, 60 Yale L.J. 673, 688 (1951); See H.R. Rep. No. 741, supra note 34, at 22,
reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 1, at 780.
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However, in exerting pressure upon the general contractor to
hire a union rather than a nonunion subcontractor, unions force an
employer to cease doing business with another employer. Labor
sought to avoid a section 8(b)(4)(A) violation by arguing that the
general contractor-subcontractor relationship should be treated as a
single legal entity for the purposes of this section. 4° This contention
focused upon the proposition that all of the contractors on a con-
struction site are engaged in a joint commercial enterprise. While
the employees of each employer perform a designated portion of
work, the totality of their efforts culminates in the completion of the
project. Stressing the integrated nature of such an undertaking,
labor argued that these numerous contractors should not be consid-
ered independent, unrelated employers.'"
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
accepted this theory of "enmeshed employment" 42 in Denver Build-
ing & Trades Council v. NLRB." This case involved a strike of
union crafts occasioned by the hiring of a nonunion subcontractor.
Judge Fahy, speaking for the court, declared that the general con-
tractor, having hired the nonunion subcontractor, could not be
considered a neutral party to the dispute of the union." Since
section 8(b)(4)(A) is designed to proscribe the "conscription of inno-
cent neutrals,"45 the general contractor could not be protected by
this section.46 The Supreme Court, however, reversed, 47 stating
that the alliance of employers in the construction industry did not
destroy their status as independent contractors." Therefore, the
union, in conducting a strike with an object of forcing a severance
of business relations between the general contractor and subcontrac-
tor, violated the ban against secondary boycotts. 49
4° See The Developing Labor Law, supra note 4, at 620; Markwell & Hartz, Inc. v.
NLRB, 387 F.2d 79, 87, 66 L.R.R.M. 2712, 2718 (5th Cir. 1967) (Wisdom, j., dissenting).
See generally Hearings on H.R. 6411 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 House Hearings].
1965 House Hearings, supra note 40, at 21.
42
 In a case involving a similar fact situation, Judge Clark, accepting the union's
contention, used this phrase to describe the general contractor/subcontractor relationship.
Local 501, IBEW v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 41, 25 L.R.R.M. 2449, 2455 (2d Cir. 1950)
(dissenting opinion).
" 2
 186 F.2d 326, 26 L.R.R.M. 2515 (D.C. Cir. 1950), rev'd, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
44 186 F.2d at 337, 26 L.R.R.M. at 2524.
45 Id. at 335, 26 L.R.R.M. at 2523. Senator Taft, discussing the purpose of
8(h)(4)(A), stated: "This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to
injure the business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between
an employer and his employees." 93 Cong. Rec. 4198 (1947) (emphasis added).
46 "We think in fact that the picketing must be considered as against the [general
contractor] and [subcontractor]—inseparably. . . . The contractor cannot separate itself from
the conditions there so as to make the action by the Council against it secondary; nor can the
subcontractor." 186 F.2d at 337, 26 L.R.R.M. at 2524.
47 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
46 Id. at 689.
49 It is interesting to note that the Court relied upon the expertise of the Board, id. at
691-92. However, the Board did not exercise jurisdiction over the construction industry until
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Theoretically, the damage resulting from the inability of con-
struction unions to exert pressure upon the general contractor could
be mitigated by the organization of a substantial number of subcon-
tractors. However, the principle espoused in Denver Builders se-
verely restricted the recognitional and organizational powers of
labor in the construction industry. Since most crafts hire only a
small number of workers, the application of pressure upon the
subcontractor seldom produced positive results. While a few of his
employees might respect the picket line and refuse to work, the
subcontractor could, more often than not, hire enough workers who
would disregard the activities of the union. 5° Consequently, rather
than apply pressure directly upon the subcontractor, unions erected
a picket line around the entire jobsite. This action was designed to
elicit the support of the unionized crafts so that a work stoppage
could be achieved. The general contractor would then have to
discharge the nonunion subcontractor unless the latter acceded to
the demands of labor. 51 However, based upon the "separate and
neutral employers" principle established in Denver Builders, the
Court held 52 that such activity constituted a secondary boycott. 53
1949 in United Bhd, of Carpenters (Wadsworth Bldg. Co.), 81 N.L.R.B. 802, 804, 23
L.R.R.M, 1403, 1404 (1949). See Comment, Common Situs Picketing and the Construction
Industry, 54 Geo. L.J, 962, 966 (1966). It has been suggested by the Secretary of Labor that
the treatment of the contractors as independent employers resulted from the unfamiliarity of
the Board with the nature of the construction industry. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 40,
at 21 (statement of Secretary Wirtz).
Su
 Comment, supra note 39, at 688; Local 501, IBEW v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 41, 25
L.R.R.M. 2449, 2455 (2d Cir. 1950) (dissenting ,opinion).
32
 The argument has been made that picketing which forces the nonunion workers to
organize because of a fear of losing their jobs is violative of § 8(b)(1)(A). The Board accepted
this reasoning in Curtis Bros., 119 N.L.R.B. 232, 236-37, 41 L.R.R.M. 1025, 1026-27 (1957).
The Supreme Court reversed, stating: "§ 8(b)(1)(A) is a grant of power to the Bawd limited to
authority to proceed against union tactics involving violence, intimidation, and reprisal or
threat thereof—conduct involving more than general pressures upon persons employed by the
affected employers implicit in strikes." NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 290
(1960).
52
 Local 501, IBEW v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
51
 In 1950, the Board delineated four criteria which should be applied to determine the
legality of a union's picketing where both the primary and secondary employer occupy a
common situs:
[Wle believe that picketing the premises of a secondary employer is primary if it
meets the following conditions: (a) the picketing is strictly limited to the times when
the situs of the dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises; (b) at the
time of the picketing the primary employer is engaged in its normal business at the
situs; (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location of the situs;
and (d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the primary employer.
Sailors Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock), 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 549, 27 L.R.R.M. 1108,
1110 (1950).
The Supreme Court did not apply these rules to the picketing conducted by the union in
both Denver Builders and the IBEW case. However, the criteria have received approval from
the Court as well as a number of circuits. See Local 761, WE v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 677
(1961), and cases cited therein.
Initially, the Board adopted the view that the failure of the union to satisfy any one of the
criteria became presumptive of illegality, E.g., Machinists Local 889 (Freeman Constr. Co.),
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The effect of these decisions upon construction unions was
aptly summarized by Judge Clark:
The [general contractor] hires the [nonunion subcon-
tractor] presumably for the natural reason that he thus
obtains a low rate. If he can thus secure low rates as
desired and the union is enjoined by act of the federal
government from any protesting, he has a tremendous
incentive to employ not one, but many a nonunion contrac-
tor. And if the union is restricted from doing anything
other than picketing the subcontractor, it may be left in a
decidedly weak condition. 54
Moreover, the comparative scarcity of employment opportunities on
a jobsite aggravated the difficulties encountered by unions. The
availability of construction work is often dependent upon seasonal
factors 55 and the duration of a particular project. 56 Since employ-
ment is transitory, a single employee might be hired by several
employers during the course of a year." Therefore, in the absence of
effective power to prevent the subcontracting of work to nonunion
employers, union members could not depend upon continuous em-
ployment at union wage rates. 58 Despite these problems which are
unique to the construction industry, the Court refused to modify the
120 N.L.R.B. 753, 42 L.R.R.M. 1046 (1958); Local 399, Service & Maintenance Employees
(Roberts & Assoc's), 119 N.L.R.B. 962, 41 L.R.R.M. 1228 (1957).
Moreover, mere compliance with the formulated criteria did not necessarily insulate the
union from a § 8(b)(4)(A) violation. Circuit courts adopted the view that these tests are of an
evidentiary nature, and that the presence or absence of these criteria arc not determinative of
the legality of the picketing. See NLRB v. International Hod Carriers, 285 F.2d 397, 47
L.R.R.M. 2345 (8th Cir. 1960), cert, denied, 366 U.S. 903 (1961); Teamsters Local 859 v.
NLRB, 229 F.2d 514, 37 L.R.R.M. 2166 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956);
NLRB v. Teamsters Local 968, 225 F.2d 205, 36 L.R.R.M. 2541 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 914 (1955). As a result, any indication of a direct appeal to unions rendered the union's
activity illegal. See Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strikes and Boycotts—Another
Chapter, 59 Colum. L, Rev. 125, 141 nn. 83-88 (1959), for a listing of the circumstances
which the Board used as evidentiary bases of finding § 8(b)(4)(A) violations.
From 1948 through 1959, the application of the Moore Dry Dock criteria prevented
construction unions from engaging in recognitional and organizational picketing without
violating § 8(b)(4)(A). Compare Baltimore Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 108 N.L.R.B.
1575, 34 L. R.R. M. 1258 (1954), with the Fourth Circuit's reversal of this decision, Piezonki v.
NLRB, 219 F.2d 878, 35 L.R.R.M. 2545 (4th Cir. 1955).
See Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1363,
1374-1430 (1962), for an excellent discussion of the application of the Moore Dry Dock
standards.
54 Local 501, IBEW v. NLRB, 181 F.2d at 41, 26 L.R.R.M. at 2455.
55 See W. Haber, Industrial Relations in the Building Industry 95-126 (1930).
56 H.R. Rep. No. 741, supra note 34, at 19, reprinted in 1 Legislative History of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 776 (hereinafter cited as Legisla-
tive History]; S. Rep. No, 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1959), reprinted in 1 Legislative
History, supra, at 424.
57 Note, Developments in the Law—The Taft-Hartley, 64 Flory. L. Rev. 781, 803
(1950); W. Haber, supra note 55, at 50.
58 Developments in the Law, supra note 57, at 803.
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application of section 8(b)(4)(A) to the activities of unions in this area
of commerce."
Organized labor, however, did devise a means to circumvent
the proscription of this section. Secondary pressure could be exerted
by the execution of a hot cargo agreement, 6° a clause which pre-
vented an employer from doing business with a nonunion
employer." Consequently, the inclusion of a hot cargo agreement in
a contract between a general contractor and labor ensured that
jobsite work would be subcontracted exclusively to union em-
ployers.
59
 In other industries, however, the Supreme Court has recognized the validity of
picketing an entire situs where more than one independent contractor is conducting business.
In Local 761, IUE v, NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961), General Electric conducted operations of a
plant, but hired independent contractors to perform a variety of work within the business
premises. Seeking to insulate its employees from labor disputes involving these contractors,
General Electric erected a separate gate for the exclusive use of the contractors' employees.
General Electric and the union which represented its employees became engaged in a dispute;
a picket line was erected around all of the entrances to the plant, including the one reserved
for use by the contractors' employees. In respect of this activity, the union members employed
by the contractors refused to enter the plant. The Board held that an object of the picketing
was to force the contractors to sever relations with General Electric. Local 761, IUE, 123
N.L.R.B. 1547, 44 L.R.R.M. 1173 (1959). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed, 278 F.2d 282, 45 L.R.R.M. 3190 (D.C. Cir. 1960). However, the Supreme
Court reversed, stating that the determinative issue is the nature of the work performed by
the employees of the independent contractors. 366 U.S. at 680. Picketing is proscribed in
those situations where the following conditions exist:
There must be a separate gate marked and set apart from other gates; the work done
by the men who use the gate must be unrelated to the normal operations of the
employer and the work must be of such a kind that would not, if done when the
plant were engaged in its regular operations, necessitate curtailing those operations.
Id. at 681, quoting from Steelworkers Union v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 591, 595, 48 L.R.R.M.
2106, 2109 (2d Cir. 1961),
However, the Board and the courts refused to apply this related work concept to similar
situations in the construction industry. In Building & Constr. Trades Council (Markwell &
Hartz, Inc.), 155 N.L.R.B. 319, 60 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1965), the nonunion general contractor
subcontracted 20% of a project to subcontractors which employed union labor. The union,
seeking to become the bargaining representative of the general contractor's employees, pick-
eted all of the entrances to the project. In response to this picketing, the general contractor
segregated gates for use by his employees from those used by the subcontractor's employees.
Picketing of all the gates continued, The Board, after distinguishing the instant case from
General Electric on the basis of ownership of the premises around which the picketing took
place, said that Denver Builders controlled in this situation. Id. at 327, 60 L,R.R,M, at
1299-1300. The Fifth Circuit, enforcing the order of the Board, summarily rejected the
union's theory that the work of the subcontractors was related to that of the general contrac-
tor: "[W]e need not speculate upon the answer to this question. It is answered authoritatively
in Denver." Markwell & Hartz, Inc. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 79, 83, 66 L. R. R. M. 2712, 2714 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 914 (1968).
611
 See Teamsters Local 47 (Texas Indus,, Inc.), 112 N.L.R.B. 923, 36 L.R.R.M. 1117
(1955).
61
 However, where common carriers are concerned, hot cargo agreements are invalid at
their inception. The Board based this decision upon the provisions of § 316 of the Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 316 (1970), which prohibit a common carrier from contracting
away his duty to serve the public. Genuine Parts Co„ 119 N.L. R. B. 399, 410-13, 41
L.R.R.M. 1087, 1091-93 (1957).
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Initially, the Board62 and the courts63 held that labor could
strike to enforce these clauses. Although the union members were
participating in a concerted refusal to work, the existence of this
contract provision constituted a complete defense to an alleged
section 8(b)(4)(A) violation." This view prevailed until the decision
in Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v.
NLRB (Sand Door), 65 where the Supreme Court held that labor and
management have the right to execute hot cargo agreements, but
that unions could not utilize concerted pressure to secure
enforcement. 66
Congress, however, was dissatisfied with this decision of the
Court. Although construction unions had legitimate reasons for de-
manding the execution of hot cargo agreements, organized labor in
other areas of commerce, particularly the trucking industry, utilized
these provisions to achieve the organization of enterprises which had
previously resisted the appeals of unions. If an employer maintained
a nonunion shop, the Teamsters, having executed hot cargo agree-
ments with the trucking concerns, simply refused to transport raw
material to, or the finished product from, his place of business. This
action caused production to cease and therefore , posed a threat to the
livelihood of those who were employed by the boycotted enterprise.
Rather than face unemployment, the employees chose to organize
and recognize the union as their exclusive bargaining agent.°
62 Teamsters Local 135 (Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.), 105 N.L.R.B. 740, 32 L.R.R.M.
1350 (1953); Teamsters Local 294 (Conway's Express), 87 N.L.R.B. 972, 25 L.R.R.M. 1202
(1949).
63 Rabouin v. NLRB (Conway's Express), 195 F.2d 906, 29 L.R.R.M. 2617 (2d Cir.
1952).
64 The Board adopted the position that the strike conducted by the union did not
constitute a secondary boycott because the employers had "consented in advance" to boycott
the nonunion company. As a result of this consent, the element of forcing or requiring an
employer to discontinue business with others was absent. Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B. at
982, 25 L.R.R.M. at 1207. See Local 1976, United Mid. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S.
93, 104-05 (1958).
65
 357 U.S. 93 (1958), affg 241 F.2d 147, 39 L.R.R.M. 2428 (9th Cir. 1957), enforcing
113 N.L.R.B. 1210, 36 L.R.R.M. 1478 (1955).
66 Although recognizing that § 8(b)(4)(A) did not constrain a secondary employer from
voluntarily refusing to deal with a primary employer, the Court said:
[I]t seems probable that the freedom of choice for the employer contemplated by
§ 8(b)(4)(A) is a freedom of choice at the time the question whether to boycott or not
arises in a concrete situation calling for the exercise of judgment on a particular
matter of labor and policy. Such a choice, free from prohibited pressures—whether
to refuse to deal with another or to maintain normal business relations on the ground
that the labor dispute is no concern of his—must as a matter of federal policy be
available to the secondary employer notwithstanding any private agreement between
the parties.
357 U.S. at 105. Since an employer cannot exercise this freedom of choice when faced with a
work stoppage, unions cannot induce their members to engage in a concerted refusal to work
upon an employer's breach of the agreement. 357 U.S. at 107.
67 S. Rep. No. 187, supra note 56, at 79, reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note
56, at 475; H.R. Rep. No. 741, supra note 34, at 21, reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra,
779.
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Congress feared that the Sand Door decision would not prevent
unions from utilizing secondary pressures to accomplish the organi-
zation of nonunion employers. Since hot cargo agreements could still
be executed, a failure of the employer to comply with this provision
might result in a suit for breach of contract." The prospect of
having to pay damages was likely to compel the employer to boycott
the unorganized enterprise. 69 Furthermore, noncompliance with the
agreement could result in the presentation of uncompromising de-
mands by the union in the negotiation of the next collective bargain-
ing agreement. 7 ° In addition, unions might contend that the
employer's breach of the provision terminated the collective bargain-
ing agreement, enabling the union to present demands for a new
contract."
In order to close the loophole that the Sand Door decision had
created, Congress enacted section 8(e), 72 which prohibits the execu-
tion of hot cargo agreements in all areas of commerce with the
exception of the construction and garment industries." The legisla-
tive history concerning the exemption of the construction industry is
rather sparse. According to Senator John Kennedy, cosponsor of the
bill in the Senate, the proviso was necessary to "avoid serious
damage to the pattern of collective bargaining in [this] industr[y]." 74
°a The question of judicial enforcement was left open by the Court in Sand Door, 357
U.S. at 108. A contract action would be brought under § 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act,
which provides: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined by this Act „ . may
be brought in any district court of the United States . . . ." 29 U.S.C, § 185(a) (1970). See
Jones, Specific Enforcement of "Hot Cargo" Provisions in Collective Bargaining Agreements
by Arbitration and Under Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 6 U.C. L. A. L. Rev. 85
(1959).
See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 634 (1967); 105 Cong.
Rec. 3951 (1959), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 56, at 1007 (remarks of
Senator McClellan).
7° See Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44
Minn. L. Rev. 257, 272 (1959); Comment, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments: Labor's Use of
the Secondary Boycott, 45 Cornell L. Rev. 724, 741-42 (1960); Note, 42 Marq. L. Rev. 245,
249 (1958).
72
 105 Cong. Rec. 16590 (1959), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 56, at 1708
(remarks of Senator Kennedy and Representative Thompson).
72
 In National Woodwork Mfrs, Ass'n, 386 U.S. 612 (1967), the Court stated:
"Throughout the committee reports and debates on § 8(e), it was referred to as a measure
designed to close a loophole in § 8(b)(4)(A) of the 1947 Act." Id. at 634. See, e.g., S. Rep. No.
187, supra note 56, at 78-79, reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 56, at 474-75;
H.R. Rep. No, 741, supra note 34, at 20-21, reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra, at
778-79.
73
 The garment industry was exempted from the proscription of § 8(e) because of
problems which were entirely unrelated to those encountered by the construction industry.
The ban against hot cargo agreements was extended to the garment industry in order to
combat sweatshop conditions which prevailed in the shops. By requiring jobbers to subcon-
tract work to contractors meeting union standards, this condition could be rectified. See
Lithographers Local 78 v.' NLRB, 301 F.2d 20, 49 L.R.R.M. 2869 (5th Cir. 1962).
74
 105 Cong, Rec. 17899 (1959), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 56, at 1432
(remarks of Senator Kennedy).
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The only inferences which may be drawn from this statement are
that Congress recognized that hot cargo provisions were prevalent in
the construction industry and an integral factor in the negotiation of
new collective bargaining agreements.
However, other portions of the legislative history do indicate
that Congress extended preferential treatment to the construction
industry because of the difficulties encountered by unions in pre-
venting the subcontracting of work to nonunion employers. Follow-
ing the decision in Denver Builders, President Eisenhower appealed
to Congress to correct the inequities that 115.c1 resulted from the
application of section 8(b)(4)(A) to the activities of construction
unions. 75 In a message to the Senate, 76 the President recommended
the amendment of this section "to make clear that secondary activity
is permitted . . . under certain circumstances against secondary
employers engaged in work at a common construction site with the
primary employer." 77 Congress responded to this proposal by ex-
empting the construction industry from the proscription of section
8(e). 78 Inasmuch as this provision represents congressional action
upon a specific recommendation of the President, the conclusion
that the exemption was granted to counter the effect of Denver
Builders" seems warranted.
75 In a Special Message to the Congress on Labor-Management Relations, the President
stated: "I recommend that the act be clarified by making it explicit that concerted action
against . . an employer on a construction project who, together with other employers, is
engaged in work on the site of the project, will not be treated as a secondary boycott."
Eisenhower, Public Papers of the Presidents 41 (1954).
A similar appeal was made in 1958. Eisenhower, Public Papers of the Presidents 123
(1958).
76
 Message from the President, S. Doc. No, 10, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in
1 Legislative History, supra note 56, at 80.
77
	 at 3, reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 56, at 82.
" Senator Dirksen, a member of the Senate Conference Committee, stated: "The proviso
also excepts from the hot cargo ban and section 8(b)(4) agreements relating to contractors on
the same project. This change in the present law, which .corrects ah inequity against labor,
was recommended by President Eisenhower." 105 Cong. Rec. 17334 (1959), reprinted in 2
Legislative History, supra note 56, at 1383.
79
 Allowing the construction industry to execute hot cargo agreements relating to jobsite
work remedied labor's problems in preventing the subcontracting of work to nonunion
subcontractors. However, in other respects, the principle of Denver Builders was still effec-
tive. Therefore, a union which became involved in a dispute with a subcontractor concerning
wages, hours or working conditions was relatively powerless to exert pressure upon the
offending employer.
Subsections 702(c) and (d) of H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), were formulated to
"overrule the Denver Building Trades case in all its applications. [It] permit[s] picketing in the
construction industry at the site of a labor dispute without regard to the effect upon the
employees of the other contractors working on the same project." H.R. Rep. No. 741, supra
note 34, at 22, reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 56, at 780. However, H.R. 8400,
which did not contain a construction site picketing provision, was passed by the House.
Since 1959, several legislative proposals for a construction site picketing provision have
been discussed by both houses of Congress. However, no such legislation has been enacted.
See Comment, Common Situs Picketing and the Construction Industry, 54 Geo. L.J. 962
(1966), for a discussion of these bills. See generally 1965 House Hearings, supra note 40.
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Any further doubts as to the purpose behind this enactment are
dispelled by an examination of the limitations placed upon the right
of the construction industry to execute hot cargo agreements. The
proviso itself contains the language that these provisions may only
be executed regarding "work to be clone at the site of con-
struction." 8° In the House Conference Report, the House Managers
stated: "It should be particularly noted that . . . the proviso does not
cover boycotts of goods manufactured in an industrial plant for
installation at the jobsite, or suppliers who do not work at the
jobsite."" The Board adopted this qualification in Cardinal Indus-
tries, Inc., 82
 a case involving the validity of a clause which permit-
ted a contractor to use prefabricated materials produced off the
jobsite only if manufactured by a union company. The union's
contention that the proviso encompassed work which was not, but
which could have been, performed ,at the jobsite was rejected with-
out reference to the underlying purpose of the exemption. 83
Nevertheless, the effect of this decision illustrates the objective of
Congress in granting a qualified right to execute hot cargo agree-
ments. The union apparently desired the inclusion of such a clause
in the collective bargaining agreement to prevent the subcontracting
of jobsite work to an offsite company. However, labor did not need
a hot cargo agreement to prevent the subcontracting of work to a
nonunion employer in this situation. Such a result could be satisfac-
torily attained by organization of the prefabricator, who was subject
to the exertion of concerted pressure. Consequently, the basis for
allowing hot cargo clauses in the construction industry was absent.
A decision to permit the execution of such an agreement in these
circumstances would have unjustifiably allowed a union to exert
secondary pressure upon a nonunion enterprise.
Thus, the limited right of the construction industry to execute
hot cargo agreements embodies a congressional desire to satisfy the
special needs of the construction industry as well as the demands
of commerce. The adoption of section 8(e) ensured employers the
freedom to decide whether or not to boycott a primary employer."
In preserving the "intelligent exercise of such a choice . . Congress
. . . hoped that the scope of industrial conflict and the economic
effects of the primary dispute might be effectively limited." 85 The
proviso did permit organized labor in the construction industry to
R 0
 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
al H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 t1959), reprinted in 1 Legislative
History, supra note 56, at 943. See also 105 Cong. Rec. 16415 (1959), reprinted in 2
Legislative History, supra note 56, at 1433 (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
82
 136 N.L.R.B. 977, 49 L.R.R.M. 1908 (1962), enforced, 339 F.2d 142, 57 L,R.R.M.
2509 (6th Cir. 1964).
85
 The Board based the decision upon the plain-face meaning of the proviso and remarks
of Congressmen regarding its scope. 136 N.L.R.B. at 988.
84
 See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 634 (1967).
85
 Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 105-06 (1958).
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frustrate this goal, but only to the extent that was necessary to
compensate the unions for their inability to exert concerted pressure
upon the general contractor.
In light of this background, the validity of the Board's decision
in Acco Equipment can properly be evaluated. The first part of the
discussion will examine the propriety of the -abridgement of the
unqualified right to execute hot cargo agreements relating to jobsite
work. Secondly, the impact of this decision upon labor-management
relations in the construction industry will be discussed.
In 1969, the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
12 (Operating Engineers), executed two master agreements with the
Associated General Contractors of America (Contractors), both of
which contained an identical provision concerning the repair of
heavy duty machinery, such as shovels, cranes and tractors, pur-
chased during the term of the contract. The parties agreed that
the employees of the equipment dealer could perform repairs on the
site of construction for the duration of the warranty period provided
by the purchase agreement. After expiration of this period, either
employees covered by the contract or employees of an employer who
had an "appropriate agreement" with the union were to perform
these repairs. Various Contractors violated this provision, subcon-
tracting post-warranty repair work to Acco Equipment, a dealer
who employed nonunion labor. Pursuant to another provision of the
master agreements, Operating Engineers exacted fines from these
Contractors.
In response, Acco Equipment instituted an unfair labor practice
proceeding against Operating Engineers, alleging, inter alia, 86 that
the execution of the repair work provision violated section 8(e) of the
NLRA. The Administrative Law Judge, finding that the construc-
tion industry proviso does not encompass such an agreement, sus-
tained this allegation. Basing his conclusion on the difference be-
tween the servicing of machinery and work which is typically per-
formed on the jobsite, the Judge made the following observations:
(1) the repair of equipment does not have to be done at the jobsite,
but can be performed in the shop of a dealer; (2) repairmen do not
perform building or construction work; (3) the equipment which is
serviced does not become part of the finished building; and (4) the
86
 Acco Equipment also alleged that the exaction of fines by Operating Engineers
violated § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ..
4(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce . . • where
. . . an object is:
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transport-
ing or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer . . . or to cease doing
business . . . with any other person . . . .
Both the Administrative Law Judge and the Board sustained this allegation. 204 N.L.R.B.
No. 114, at 2 (1973).
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repairmen are not regularly employed construction workers, but are
sporadically dispatched to the jobsite whenever necessary."
The Board, without elaborating upon these findings, adopted
the determination of the Administrative Law Judge as the proper
conclusion of the law. 88 Member Fanning dissented on the grounds
that the plain-face meaning and the legislative history of section 8(e)
indicates that an agreement relating to the jobsite repair of equip-
ment is protected by the proviso."
In reaching this result, neither the Board nor the Judge directed
attention to the reasons behind the enactment of the proviso, but
rather emphasized the definition of the word "work" as used in
section 8(e). It is submitted that such an analytical approach defeats
the congressional purpose in granting preferential treatment to
unions in the construction industry. The drafters of the proviso did
not distinguish between the type or nature of the work involved in
the various tasks on a jobsite. The imposition of restrictions upon
the word "work" would have been self-defeating. All union crafts
could not utilize concerted pressure to prevent the subcontracting of
work to nonunion employers. In terms of this problem, the only
appropriate limitation upon the right to execute hot cargo agree-
ments relates to the situs, rather than to the nature, of the work.
Based upon this reasoning, the determinative factor in evaluating
the applicability of the proviso should be whether the subject of the
agreement is work that is performed on the jobsite.
Such an analysis rejects the proposition that the proviso en-
compasses only those agreements which relate to work that cannot
be performed outside the, geographical boundaries of the jobsite.
This assertion is contrary to the conclusion of the Administrative
Law Judge in Acco Equipment. 9° The Judge's determination was
based upon the decision of the Board in Island Dock Lumber,
Inc., 91 a case involving the delivery of ready mix cement to a
construction site by nonunion drivers. These drivers, in addition to
transporting the material, actually mixed and poured the liquid
cement while on the jobsite. The Teamsters alleged that the contrac-
tor, in allowing the work to be performed on the site, violated an
agreement whereby all onsite work was to be performed by mem-
bers of the Local.
The Board in Island Dock pointed out that "though the mixing
may have taken place on the site, it equally could have taken place
off the site . . . . [T]he mixing is not necessarily 'work to be done at
87 204 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 30-31 (opinion of the Administrative Law Judge).
" Id. at I, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1458.
89 Id. at 2, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1458.
90 Id. at 34-35 (opinion of the Administrative Law Judge).
91 Teamsters Local 294 (Island Dock Lumber, Inc.), 145 N.L.R.B. 484, 54 L.R.R.M.
1421 (1963).
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the site within the meaning of section 8(e).' " 92 While this statement
seemingly supports the position of the Board in Acco Equipment,
the fact situation in the two cases is distinguishable to the extent
that reliance upon Island Dock is ill-founded. Liquid concrete is a
material purchased by the contractor, the delivery of which is not
complete until the substance has been poured into molds on the
jobsite. 93
 A step in the delivery process of the finished product is the
mixing operation." Since the construction industry proviso does not
exempt agreements which relate to material delivered to the
jobsite," the Board held that the Teamsters could not demand that
the mixing be performed by members of the Local.
On the other hand, the performance of post-warranty repair
work unequivocally occurs after delivery is completed. Therefore,
the rationale of Island Dock is clearly inapplicable to the facts of
Acco Equipment. Neither precedent, legislative history or the plain-
face meaning of the proviso support the proposition that the subject
of hot cargo agreements in the construction industry must relate to
work which, of necessity, can only be performed on the jobsite.
When juxtaposed to the purpose of Congress in exempting the
construction industry from the proscription of section 8(e), this as-
sertion validates the conclusion that the decision in Acco Equipment
is erroneous.
One can only speculate in forecasting the effect of Acco Equip-
ment upon the course of future litigation. As stated by Member
Fanning in his dissent, the Judge "struck out in all directions" to
restrict the scope of the exemption. 96
 Yet, the factors which per-
suaded the Judge were not synthesized into a set of guidelines which
would aid in assessing the legality of these agreements. 97 After
reading the decision, one does not know whether the proviso en-
compasses agreements relating to work which can only be per-
formed on the jobsite; whether the product of the work must become
part of the finished building; or whether the work must relate to
construction or installation. Since an absence of any of these factors
affects the scope of the exemption, Acco Equipment is subject to a
range of interpretations. For the purposes of discussion, an exami-
nation of a narrow and a broad reading of these criteria will de-
lineate the spectrum of possible consequences deriving from this
decision.
92
 Id. at 490, 54 L.R.R.M. at 1424.
93
 See Teamsters Local 559 (Co'nnecticut Sand & Stone Corp.), 138 N.L.R.B. 532, 51
L.R.R.M. 1092 (1962).
94
 145 N.L.R.B. at 491, 54 L.R.R.M. at 1424.
95
 See text accompanying note 81 supra.
96
 204 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 2, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1458.
92
 In the "Envoi" section of his opinion, the Administrative Law Judge did delineate the
factors which should be considered in determining the validity of a hot cargo agreement. 204
N.L.R.I3. No. 114, at 40-41 (opinion of the Administrative Law Judge). The Board refused to
comment upon these criteria, and specifically rejected this section of the Judge's opinion as the
basis of its decision. 204 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 1, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1458.
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Narrowly construed, Acco Equipment indicates that work
which is unrelated to the actual construction of a building cannot be
the subject of a hot cargo agreement. Under this interpretation, the
proviso encompasses agreements relating to tasks which are per-
formed on the site of construction and which physically contribute
to the erection of the structure. Since the application of these stan-
dards would not substantially limit the scope of the exemption, such
an interpretation of the Board's decision would have a minimal
effect upon the disposition of future cases.
However, if read in a broader light, this decision indicates that
the test for determining the legitimacy of a hot cargo agreement
would be whether or not the work could be performed off, as well as
on, the jobsite. This standard renders the legality of such an agree-
ment a function of the technological advances achieved in the auto-
mation of construction work. With the development of modernized
techniques of fabrication, many tasks which formerly could only be
performed on the jobsite can now be accomplished in an industrial
plant. 95 Acceptance of this interpretation of Acco Equipment would
substantially limit the scope of the proviso, and would therefore
prevent a number of construction unions from utilizing hot cargo
agreements to counter their inability to exert concerted pressure
upon the general contractor.
However, even such a restrictive interpretation of the proviso
does not unduly hamper union pursuit of employment opportunities
for their members. Many of the tasks formerly encompassed by this
exemption could still be protected by the execution of a work pres-
ervation agreement. 99 Under such a clause, the general contractor
cannot subcontract work which had been traditionallym performed
96 Packaged boilers with trim piping attached were introduced and used in the St.
Paul area before 1941. By the mid-1940's, ten per cent of the boilers being installed
were of the packaged variety. Their use increased rapidly, and by 1963, had risen to
sixty five per cent of all boiler installations.
American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 547, 549, 69 L.R.R.M. 2851, 2852 (8th Cir.
1968), Query: Would fabrication work of this nature qualify as basically offsite work? In
addition, one commentator has argued that fabrication is a service rather than work. See
Previant, The New Hot Cargo and Secondary Boycott Sections: A Critical Analysis, 48 Geo.
L.J, 346, 357 (1959), in which the author contends that hot cargo clauses relating to fabrica-
tion are not banned by § 8(e), with or without the proviso, because the proscription of this
section does not encompass agreements involving the purchase of a service.
99 In National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1966), the Supreme
Court held that this subcontracting clause is not violative of § 8(e) provided that all of the
surrounding circumstances of the case indicate that the union's objective was the preservation
of work. Id. at 644. In assessing the legality of work preservation agreements, itlhe touch-
stone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the labor relations of the
contracting employer visa vis his own employees." Id. at 645. If a finding is made that the
union demanded the inclusion of such a clause so as to satisfy its objectives elsewhere, i.e.,
organization of a nonunion enterprise, then labor and management have violated § 8(e). Id, at
644.
in The Supreme Court has not defined the meaning of "traditional work." However, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has interpreted this phrase as including "work which
unit employees have performed or are performing at the time they negotiated a work-
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by employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement. In
addition, the general contractor can be dissuaded from awarding
contracts to nonunion employers by the execution of a "union
standards" 1 ° 1 clause. An agreement of this nature provides that
work can be subcontracted only to those employers which observe
the equivalent of union wages, hours, and conditions of
employment.' 02 The successful negotiation of such a provision pre-
vents a nonunion subcontractor from taking advantage of the poten-
tially lower wage demands of his employees. Therefore, the labor
policies of the various employers will not be determinative in the
computation of bids for the,general contractor. To this extent, an
economic parity between all subcontractors is achieved, and union
employers are not disadvantaged in acquiring contracts for construc-
tion work.
In light of the availability of these alternatives to the execution
of hot cargo agreements, the necessity for the construction industry
proviso is cast in doubt. Not only do work preservation and union
preservation clause." American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 547, 552, 69
L.R.R.M. 2851, 7854 (8th Cir. 1968), modifying 167 N.L.R.B. 602, 66 L.R.R.M. 1098
(1967), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970).
101
 A union standards clause should be distinguished from a "union signatory" clause.
Under the latter, the general contractor is restricted to subcontracting to employers which
have an appropriate agreement with the union {the post-warranty repair clause in Acco
Equipment is of such a nature. See 204 N.L.R.B. No. 114 at 1, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1457). With
the exception of those agreements which are encompassed by the construction industry
proviso, union signatory clauses are violative of § 8(e). See further discussion in note 102
infra.
102
 Initially, the Board held that all contract clauses which limit the subcontracting of
work either to union employers or to employers which satisfy union terms and conditions of
employment are illegal under § 8(e). Teamsters Local 710 (Wilson & Co.), 143 N.L.R.B. 1221,
53 L.R.R.M. 1475 (1963), enforced in part, set aside in part and remanded in part, 335 F.2d
709, 56 L.R.R. M. 2570 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Teamsters Local 413 (Patton Warehouse, Inc.), 140
N.L.R.B. 1474, 52 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1963), enforced in part and set aside in part, 334 F.2d
539, 55 L.R.R.M, 2878 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964); Ohio Valley Carpenters
Dist. Council (Cardinal Indus., Inc.) 136 N.L.R.B. 977, 49 L.R.R.M. 1908 (1962), enforced,
339 F.2d 142, 57 L.R.R.M. 2509 (6th Cir. 1964).
However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with this
interpretation of § 8(e), holding that union signatory clauses, see note 101 supra, are invalid,
but that union standards clauses are valid. Teamsters Local 413 v. NLRB (Patton
Warehouse), 334 F.2d 539, 55 L.R.R.M. 2878 (D.C. Cir. 1964), enforcing in part and
vacating in part 140 N.L.R.B. 1474, 52 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916
(1964); Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534, 55 L.R.R.M.
2293 (D.C. Cir. 1964), remanding 139 N.L.R.B. 383051 L.R.R.M. 1315 (1962). The court
said that a clause which is " `germane to the economic integrity of the principal work unit',
and seeks] to protect and preserve the work and standards the [union] has bargained for' " is
valid. Orange Belt, 328 F.2d at 538, 55 L.R.R.M. at 226. However, if a finding is made that
such a clause was demanded so that union objectives with another employer could be fulfilled,
§ 8(e) has been violated. Id., 55 L.R.R, M. at 2296; Building & Constr. Trades Council v.
NLRB, 328 F.2d 540, 55 L.R.R.M. 2297 (D.C. Cir. 1964), enforcing in part 139 N.L.R.B.
236, 51 L.R.R.M. 1294 (1962). The Board accepted this view in Teamsters Local 107 (S. & E.
McCormick, Inc.), 159 N.L.R.B. 84, 62 L.R.R.M. 1224 (1966), vacated and remanded sub
nom. A. Duie Pyle, Inc. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 772, 65 L.R.R.M. 3107 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968).
1310
HOT CARGO AGREEMENTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
standards clauses effectively restrict the right of a general contractor
to subcontract work, but unlike hot cargo agreements, neither of
these provisions permit the union to achieve the secondary objective
of forcing a nonunion subcontractor to change his labor policy.
Evaluated in this context, an argument that limitations should be
placed upon the scope of the proviso does have merit.
Nevertheless, judicial and administrative implementation of
such a policy could have a damaging ancillary effect. Labor's power
to enforce a hot cargo agreement is limited to institution of judicial
procedures, 103 while work preservation 104 and union standard'°5
clauses are enforceable by resort to concerted action. Therefore, by
forcing construction unions to execute the latter subcontracting
clauses, the Board and the courts would, in - effect, be encouraging
the outbreak of strikes in the construction industry. In this situation,
the injury to the business of neutral employers, a concomitant of any
strike,'" could be greatly multiplied--those subcontractors engaged
in work which demands the completion of a previous portion of the
project might not be able to proceed because of the domino-like
effect of a work stoppage in an earlier stage of production.
The legislative history of the 1959 amendments to the Taft-
Hartley Act does not indicate that Congress considered this factor in
prohibiting self-enforcement of hot cargo agreements. When consid-
ered in terms of the policy of minimizing industrial strife so as to
increase the free flow of commerce,'° 7 it seems that the scope of the
proviso should not be limited. However, legislative scrutiny must
also concentrate upon the effect of these agreements upon nonunion
employers. The inclusion of such a provision in the collective bar-
gaining agreement executed by labor and the general contractor
compels nonunion subcontractors to organize. Although toleration of
this undesirable consequence might have been justified when the
proviso was enacted, the validity of such condonation is suspect in
103
 The Board and the courts have adhered to the Sand Door mandate that strikes to
enforce hot cargo agreements are illegal. Essex County & Vicinity Dist. Council of Carpenters
v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636, 56 L.R.R.M. 2091 (3d Cir. 1964); Orange Belt Dist. Council of
Painters No. 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534, 55 L.R.R.M, 2293 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Building &
Constr. Trades Council (Centlivre Village Apts.), 148 N.L.R.B. 854, 57 L.R.R.M. 1081
(1964), remanded on other grounds, 352 F.2d 696, 59 L.R.R.M. 2894 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
In addition to judicial enforcement, unions may enforce a hot cargo agreement by
arbitration procedures and court enforcement pursuant to 301. See note 68, supra; Sheet
Metal Workers, Local 48 v. Hardy Corp., 332 F.2d 682, 56 L.R.R.M. 2462 (5th Cir. 1964).
1 " Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 664 (1967); National
Woodworkers Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967); American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v.
NLRB, 404 F.2d 547, 69 L.R.R.M. 2851 (8th Cir. 1968), modifying 167 N.L.R.B, 602, 66
L.R.R.M. 1098 (1967), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970).
1 " See cases from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit cited in note
102 supra.
'°6
 "Some disruption of business relationships is the necessary consequence of the purest
form of primary activity." NLRB v. Operating Engineers, Local 825, 400 U.S. 297, 304
(1971). See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
3 " 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
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light of the alternative contract provisions which unions can employ
to restrict the subcontracting of work. It is apparent that the time
has arrived for Congress to reevaluate the necessity of hot cargo
agreements in the construction industry. In 1959, congressional con-
cern focused upon the inability of construction unions to prevent the
subcontracting of work to nonunion employers; presently, legislative
attention must be directed toward weighing the effect of these
agreements upon nonunion employers against the impact that the
deletion of the proviso would have upon commerce.
CONCLUSION
The construction industry was exempted from the ban of sec-
tion 8(e) because of the inability of organized labor to prevent the
subcontracting of jobsite work to nonunion employers. Since all
unions were prohibited from exerting concerted pressure upon the
general contractor to hire a union subcontractor, the proviso should
encompass agreements relating to any tasks performed on the job-
site, regardless of the nature of the work involved. Therefore, Acco
Equipment's nullification of the right of the construction industry to
execute hot cargo agreements involving the jobsite repair of heavy
duty equipment frustrates the congressional objective in adopting
the exemption.
Although neither the statutory language nor the legislative his-
tory of section 8(e) support the position of the Board in Acco Equip-
ment, perhaps a narrow, restrictive interpretation of the proviso
should be encouraged. By articulating such a view, the administra-
tive and judicial bodies might spur Congress to reconsider the
propriety of extending preferential treatment to the construction
industry. The inclusion of either a work preservation clause or a
union standards clause in the collective bargaining agreement would
provide unions with viable alternatives to the execution of hot cargo
agreements. When examined in this light, it is quite possible that the
legislators will conclude that the construction industry proviso is an
unnecessary appendage to the body of section 8(e).
ALLAN H. CARLIN
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